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NTP v. RIM: The Diverging Law Between System and 
Method Claim Infringement 
STEPHEN P. COLE*
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost thirty years after the landmark decision of Decca Ltd. v. United 
States,1 the Federal Circuit had an opportunity to reevaluate the extraterri-
torial limits of U.S. patent law in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.2  
After withdrawing its initial opinion (“NTP I”) and issuing a second opin-
ion (“NTP II”), the court held that a system having a component located 
outside U.S. jurisdiction could be subject to U.S. patent law.3  The court 
held as a matter of law, however, that a process in which a step is per-
formed outside U.S. jurisdiction could not be subject to U.S. patent law.4  
In NTP I and NTP II, the infringing system included a component located 
in Canada.5  Ironically, that infringing system was the platform on which 
the non-infringing process operated.6  The court’s justification for this re-
sult was based on the “collective” nature of systems compared to the “indi-
vidual” nature of processes.7
This article analyzes the court’s decision and recommends an alterna-
tive holding in order to unify “system” and process infringement law.  Ad-
ditionally, this article examines the history of “system” claims to determine 
whether their current use as “machine” claims is consistent with their his-
torical use.8  Given its historical context, this article then evaluates whether 
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, 2007. 
 1. 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam).  The opinions of the United States Court of Claims 
and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that were decided up until September 30, 
1982 are binding precedent on the Federal Circuit.  South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 2. 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (NTP I), withdrawn, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (NTP II), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). 
 3. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1317. 
 4. Id. at 1318. 
 5. Id. at 1290; NTP I, 392 F.3d at 1342. 
 6. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1318. 
 7. Id. (“Because a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of which it is comprised, 
the use of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the steps recited.  This is unlike 
use of a system as a whole, in which the components are used collectively, not individually.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 8. “System” is not included in the five statutory classifications of the patent system.  See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2006) (the five statutory classifications are process, machine, manufacture, composition of 
matter, and an improvement thereof).   
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a preamble including a “system” should limit a claim’s scope under the 
current law.  Finally, this article evaluates the effect of the court’s decision 
on communications and secondary-use patents.9
II. BACKGROUND 
NTP owns five patents for “integrating existing electronic mail 
[‘email’] systems with radio frequency (‘RF’) wireless communication 
networks . . . enabl[ing] a mobile user to receive email over a wireless 
network.”10  Thus, an email message may be transmitted both traditionally 
through an existing email system to a personal computer as well as wire-
lessly to a handheld receiver.11  This wireless transmission is “advanta-
geous because it eliminat[es] the requirement that the destination processor 
[be] turned on and carried with the user to receive messages.”12
Research in Motion (“RIM”) sells the BlackBerry system, consisting 
of a handheld unit, email redirector software, and access to a nationwide 
wireless network.13   
The BlackBerry system utilizes “push” technology to automatically 
forward email through RIM’s wireless network without a “user-initiated 
connection.”14  The email redirector software “copies, encrypts, and 
routes” new email messages to a relay located in Canada, “where it is 
translated and routed from the processors in the user’s email system to a 
partner wireless network.”15  Additionally, BlackBerry users can send 
email messages from their handheld unit using the same wireless net-
work.16
  
 9. A secondary use patent relates to a new use for an old material or apparatus.  See Perricone v. 
Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] patent to an apparatus does not 
necessarily prevent a subsequent inventor from obtaining a patent on a new method of using the appa-
ratus.  New uses of old products or processes are indeed patentable subject matter.” (citations omitted)). 
 10. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1287-89 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The patents at issue were U.S. Patent No. 
5,436,960 (filed May 20, 1991) (“the ’960 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 5,625,670 (filed May 18, 1995) 
(“the ’670 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 5,819,172 (filed Apr. 23 1997) (“the ’172 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 
6,067,451 (filed Sept. 28, 1998) (“the ’451 patent”); and U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 (filed Dec. 6, 1999) 
(“the ’592 patent”).  Id. at 1287. 
 11. Id. at 1289. 
 12. Id. (quoting the ’960 patent col.18 ll.44-46 (quotations omitted)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1289-90. 
 16. Id. at 1290. 
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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
NTP sued RIM in November 2001 alleging patent infringement.17  
NTP contended that RIM’s BlackBerry system infringed over forty of 
NTP’s “system” and method claims.18  Before trial, NTP prevailed on its 
motion for partial summary judgment of infringement of four claims.19  
The remaining claims were fully litigated and then submitted to a jury.20   
At summary judgment, the court agreed that “to establish direct in-
fringement under [35 U.S.C.] § 271(a), NTP was obligated to show that 
RIM practiced all of the steps of the process patented in [NTP’s] inven-
tions in the United States.”21  The court later changed its position, how-
ever, by instructing the jury that “the location of RIM’s [r]elay in Canada 
does not preclude infringement.”22   
The jury reached a verdict in favor of NTP on all counts presented.23  
This included direct, induced, and contributory infringement.24  Further-
more, the jury found that RIM willfully infringed.25  The jury awarded 
NTP over fifty three million dollars in damages based on compensatory 
damages, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment interest, and enhanced damages.26
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
that RIM infringed NTP’s “system” and method claims.27  RIM filed “a 
combined petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.”28  The Fed-
eral Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and withdrew its origi-
nal opinion.29  The replacement opinion held that RIM infringed NTP’s 
“system” claims but not its method claims due to the location of RIM’s 
relay station in Canada.30
  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1291. 
In its motion, NTP argued: (1) that the 800 and 900 series BlackBerry handheld units in-
fringed claim 248 of the ’451 patent and claim 150 of the ’592 patent; (2) that the BES 
software infringed claim 653 of the ’592 patent; and (3) that the BlackBerry system, soft-
ware, and handhelds infringed claim 15 of the ’960 patent.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1314 (citation omitted). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1291. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1292; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 285 (2006) (stating that the court can provide enhanced dam-
ages “up to three times the amount found or assessed” and providing for attorneys’ fees in “exceptional 
cases”). 
 27. NTP I, 392 F.3d 1336, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 28. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1317-18. 
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IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN NTP II 
The Federal Circuit began its infringement analysis by evaluating the 
language of the relevant statute for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 
271(a).31  The statute provides that “whoever without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of 
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”32  The court framed the issue as 
“whether the using, offering to sell, or selling of a patented invention is an 
infringement under section 271(a) if a component or step of the patented 
invention is located or performed abroad.”33  Thus, the court recognized 
that “within the United States” was a further limitation to § 271(a) beyond 
the infringing acts of making, using, offering to sell, selling, or import-
ing.34  The court went on to state that “it is unclear from the statutory lan-
guage how the territoriality requirement limits direct infringement where 
the location of at least a part of the ‘patented invention’ is not the same as 
the location of the infringing act.”35
Both the NTP I and NTP II courts distinguished Deepsouth Packing 
Co. v. Laitram Corp.,36 the “seminal case addressing the territoriality of 
section 271(a).”37  In Deepsouth, the plaintiff, Laitram Corporation, owned 
two patents on shrimp-deveining machines.38  To bypass Laitram’s patents, 
Deepsouth sought to “make the parts of [the] deveining machines, to sell 
them to foreign buyers, and to have the buyers assemble the parts and use 
the machines abroad.”39  The Supreme Court held that Deepsouth could 
not be liable for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).40  The Court 
stated that Deepsouth did not “make” the patented machines within the 
United States because Deepsouth only made the machine’s parts.41  There-
  
 31. Id. at 1315. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (emphasis added). 
 33. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1315.  The court framed the issue differently in NTP I: “[t]he question 
before us is whether the location of a component of an accused system abroad, where that component 
facilitates operation of the accused system in the United States, prevents the application of section 
271(a) to that system.”  392 F.3d at 1368. 
 34. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 37. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1315; NTP I, 392 F.3d 1336, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 38. 406 U.S. at 519-20. 
 39. Id. at 523. 
 40. Id. at 529. 
 41. Id. at 528-29.  The Court stated that: 
We cannot endorse the view that the “substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of (a) 
machine” constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a combination 
patent protects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of 
its parts.  “For as we pointed out in Mercoid v. Mid-Contintent Investment Co.[, 320 U.S. 
661 (1944) (Mercoid I),] a patent on a combination is a patent on the assembled or function-
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fore, Deepsouth could not “use” the patented machines within the United 
States.42  Congress responded to Deepsouth in 1984 by “enact[ing] [35 
U.S.C.] § 271(f), which extends infringement liability to cover the export 
of elements of patented inventions.”43
The NTP I and NTP II courts distinguished Deepsouth based on the lo-
cation of the infringing device in each case.44  In Deepsouth, “the key 
premise . . . was that Deepsouth was not using the machines in the United 
States as a ‘whole operable system assembly’ because Deepsouth did not 
combine the components for use in the United States.”45  In contrast, the 
NTP I court stated that “the location of the infringement [in this case] is 
within United States territory, not abroad as in Deepsouth.”46  The NTP II 
court further elaborated that in Deepsouth, “both the act of making and the 
resulting patented invention were wholly outside the United States.  By 
contrast, this case involves a system that is partly within and partly outside 
the United States and relates to acts that may be occurring within or out-
side of the United States.”47
Both the NTP I and NTP II courts relied on Decca Ltd. v. United Stat-
es48 to determine whether RIM infringed even though its relay was located 
in Canada.49  In Decca, the United States government operated a terrestrial 
global positioning system called “Omega.”50  The system worked by 
broadcasting synchronized radio signals from a series of stations located 
around the world.51  Ships and aircraft could receive those signals and then 
calculate their location based on the differences between signal arrival 
times.52  At the time of the suit, the government owned two broadcasting 
stations in the United States and one in Norway.53  Since signal timing was 
critical to determine global positioning, the Norwegian station was pre-
cisely synchronized with the United States stations.54  Thus, the foreign 
  
ing whole, not on the separate parts.”  Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator 
Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 [(1944)]. 
Id. at 528. 
 42. Id. at 527. 
 43. NTP I, 392 F.3d 1336, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). 
 44. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005); NTP I, 392 F.3d at 1369. 
 45. NTP I, 392 F.3d at 1369. 
 46. Id. (quoting Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976)). 
 47. 418 F.3d at 1315. 
 48. 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam) (binding precedent to the Federal Circuit according to 
South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982)). 
 49. NTP I, 392 F.3d 1336, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 50. 544 F.2d at 1074. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
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station in Norway was akin to a “slave” station, which could not exert any 
control over the system.55   
The Decca court determined that the government infringed three 
claims of Decca’s ‘816 Patent.56  The focus of the court’s analysis was 
whether the government infringed claim 11, which recited “[a] hyperbolic 
radio navigation system” having three transmission stations.57  Since the 
government only owned two transmission stations in the United States, 
direct infringement of claim 11 could only occur if the Norwegian station 
“counted.”58  The court determined that the government’s liability was 
based on a theory of “use” rather than “making.”59  The court summarized 
its finding of liability by stating: 
This conclusion does not rest on any one factor but on the combi-
nation of circumstances here present, with particular emphasis on 
the ownership of the equipment by the United States, the control of 
the equipment from the United States and on the actual beneficial 
use of the system within the United States.60
The NTP I court applied Decca’s “control and beneficial use” test to 
RIM’s BlackBerry device and system to establish infringement of NTP’s 
“system” and method claims under § 271(a).61  Upon rehearing, however, 
the NTP II court distinguished “system” claims from method claims and 
held that RIM infringed the “system” claims but could not infringe the 
method claims due to the relay’s location in Canada.62
The NTP II court rejected RIM’s argument “that the BlackBerry sys-
tem is distinguishable from the system in Decca because the RIM [r]elay, 
which controls the accused systems and is necessary for the other compo-
nents of the system to function properly, is not located within the United 
  
 55. Id.  A master/slave system is “[a] system of interlinked computers under the control of one 
computer (master computer).”  MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 
1289 (6th ed. 2003). 
 56. U.S. Patent No. 2,844,816 (filed Mar. 7, 1955).  The suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 
which provides a private party with a cause of action against the government to recover financially 
from patent infringement.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 
1072 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
 57. Id. at 1081. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1082-83. 
 60. Id. at 1083.  The court’s only authority for this proposition rests in Rosen v. NASA, 152 U.S.P.Q. 
757 (B.P.A.I. 1966).  Id.  In Rosen, the Board of Patent Interferences held “that an invention concern-
ing space satellites was reduced to practice in the United States because of the location of control 
stations here.”  Id.  Analysis of Rosen and its authority over the Court of Claims is beyond the scope of 
this article.  See generally Daniel P. Homiller, From Deepsouth to the Great White North: The Extra-
territorial Reach of United States Patent Law After Research in Motion, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
17, ¶¶ 11-12 (2005) (critiquing the application of Rosen to Decca and NTP I). 
 61. NTP I, 392 F.3d 1336, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 62. 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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States.”63  The court found that while this was a valid technical difference, 
the use of the system by U.S. customers, like the use in Decca by the U.S. 
government, was “as a whole,” within the United States.64
The NTP II court’s method analysis distinguished Decca and Deep-
south because “there is no corresponding whole operable assembly of a 
process claim.”65  The court further elaborated by stating that  
 
[b]ecause a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of 
which it is comprised, the use of a process necessarily involves do-
ing or performing each of the steps recited.  This is unlike use of a 
system as a whole, in which the components are used collectively, 
not individually.66   
 
Thus, each process step must be performed within the United States in 
order to infringe under § 271(a).67
V. HISTORY OF SYSTEM CLAIMS 
A “system” is generally equated to an apparatus or machine.68  For in-
stance, a “system” usually contains several components that are used “col-
lectively” to achieve a particular result.69  A “system,” however, is not 
itself one of the five statutory classifications in the patent system.70  There-
fore, it is helpful to analyze the historical roots of “system” to determine 
how it evolved within the statutory classification system.  
Many early “system” patents taught processes or methods.  The first 
United States patent incorporating the term “system” was issued in 1837 
under the title “System of Cutting Garments.”71  This patent teaches a 
process of taking body measurements and then transferring those meas-
urements onto a piece of fabric to create an article of clothing.72  While 
  
 63. Id. at 1317. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1317-18. 
 66. Id. at 1318. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. (distinguishing between “systems” and “processes”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  The five statutory classifications are process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, and any “new and useful” improvement thereof.  Id. 
 71. U.S. Patent No. 256 (issued July 11, 1837). 
 72. Id.  Claim 1 is representative: “I claim in the above system of measuring and plotting—1.  Tak-
ing the level around the waist, the variations of straight and stooping men being above this line.”  Id. 
354 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
this claim was drafted in central-claiming style,73 the term “system” ap-
pears to be used in a manner equivalent to a modern claim preamble.74  
Another “system” patent, issued shortly thereafter in 1839, sets forth a 
“Mode of Writing Music.”75  This patent teaches a “system of music,” 
which appears to be a process of writing music to indicate the note, length, 
and intonation.76  There are no individualized claims in this patent to ana-
lyze how “system” is used.77  A third patent, issued in 1840, sets forth a 
“Mode of Hauling off Stranded Vessels.”78  This patent teaches a “system 
of procedure” (i.e., a method) for arranging various pieces of apparatus to 
haul away a stranded ship.79  Arguably, this patent also teaches a machine 
by creating a combination apparatus to haul away the stranded ship.80  
“System” is used three times in the patent specification but it is not used in 
any claims.81  Therefore, its meaning can only be evaluated from the speci-
fication’s context.  In summary, the term “system” was originally used 
primarily in the process context but it has also been used in the machine 
context.  
  
 73. See HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 112 n.13 (4th ed. 2003). 
In peripheral claiming, which has been dominant since around 1900 the invention is defined 
by its metes and bounds.  Prior to 1900, applicants generally practiced central claiming.  In 
central claiming, a narrow claim that used reference characters to point out an embodiment 
of the invention was set forth and a phrase (such as “substantially as described”) was added 
at the end of the claim to refer back to the specification. . . .  It was common to have only 
one or two claims under central claiming, but common to have numerous claims under pe-
ripheral claiming. 
Id. 
 74. The following is an explanation of the parts of a modern patent claim: 
[M]ost claims have three parts: (1) a preamble, (2) transitional language, and (3) a body.  
Using a ceiling fan as an example, a claim with these three parts could be . . .  
A ceiling fan comprising: (a) a motor having a rod extending outwardly, (b) three 
blades disposed from the rod, and (c) a cord coupled to the motor for switching the 
motor on and off.  
In this example, “A ceiling fan” is the preamble, “comprising” is the transitional language, 
and (a) through (c) make up the body. 
Id. at 141. 
 75. U.S. Patent No. 1383 (issued Oct. 26, 1839). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. U.S. Patent No. 1832 (issued Oct. 22, 1840). 
 79. Id.  Claim 1 is representative:  
1. The general manner in which I have arranged and combined the respective parts of the 
apparatus employed by me, so as to produce a new and useful effect by means substantially 
new; that is to say, I claim as my invention the manner of arranging the studding booms, 
lifts, bob-stays, guys, tackles, bull’s-eye and fall, so as to constitute a combined apparatus 
substantially the same with that herein described, for the purpose of raising the heavy an-
chors from the deck, clearing them of the vessel, and dropping them where required, in the 
manner set forth. 
Id. col.5-6 ll.11-24. 
 80. See ‘832 Patent. 
 81. Id. 
2007 NTP v. RIM 355 
Some claim-drafting treatises refer to a “system,” but none actually de-
fine it in terms of a statutory category.82  The earliest treatise to mention 
“system” was a 1930 treatise entitled Patent Claim Drafting by Emerson 
Stringham.83  This treatise stated that “[t]he word ‘system’ is not in itself 
objectionable.  [The] claims for a process of mining coal was denied in 
view of the art.  But no objection was made to the introductory expression 
reading ‘In a system of mining coal.’”84  Another treatise by Stringham, 
published in 1939, discusses two “system” claims in which the preambles 
are directed to a “lubricating system” and a “liquid pumping system.”85  
Both of these “systems” are clearly “machines,” as the claims go on to 
recite various physical components of those machines.86  Finally, a recent 
treatise by Robert C. Kahrl mentions a claim describing an “apparatus” or 
machine as “[a] system for controlling the selection and dispensing of 
product coupons.”87  Again, “system” is used in the claim’s preamble.88  In 
summary, the claim drafting treatises—while not explicitly defining “sys-
tem”—generally refer to a “system” as an apparatus or machine. 
In most cases, the Supreme Court has implicitly stated that a “system” 
is a machine.89  A case from 1854 addressed the patent infringement of 
several “system” claims.90  While the Court did not specifically address 
whether the “systems” were methods or machines, it appears that “system” 
claims could take the form akin to a computer system (machine) or a proc-
ess.91  A case in 1885 addressed an injunction for a patent on an “Im-
  
 82. See, e.g., ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (3d ed. 
1990) (no mention of “system”); EUSTACE S. GASCOCK & EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENT SOLICITING 
AND EXAMINING: A GUIDE TO EX PARTE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE (1934) (no 
mention of “system”); ROBERT C. KAHRL, PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION § 4.03(G) (2005); JOHN L. 
LANDIS, MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (1974) (no mention of “system”); EMERSON 
STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIMS: A DRAFTER’S MANUAL 316, 372, 425 (1939) [hereinafter PATENT 
DRAFTER’S MANUAL]; EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 5170 (1930) [hereinafter 
PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING]. 
 83. PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING, supra note 82, § 5170. 
 84. Id. 
 85. PATENT DRAFTER’S MANUAL, supra note 82, at 372, 425. 
 86. Id.  The lubricating system claim is illustrative:  
A lubricating system for the bearings of a machine, comprising a pipe leading to a bearing, a 
source of lubricant under variable pressure, a valve to control the flow of lubricant from said 
source into said pipe, hand-operated means to open said valve, and means, operated by the 
pressure of the lubricant, to close said valve. 
Id. at 372. 
 87. KAHRL, supra note 82, § 4.03(G).  The claim recites: “A system . . . comprising: activation 
means . . . ; display means . . . ; selection means . . . ; print means . . . ; and control means . . . .”  Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Mercoid I, 320 U.S. 661, 664 (1944); Elec. R.R. Signal Co. v. Hall Ry. Signal Co., 114 U.S. 
87, 91 (1885); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 104-05 (1854). 
 90. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 105-06. 
 91. See PATENT DRAFTER’S MANUAL, supra note 82, at 75-137 (analyzing the claims but not explic-
itly defining the word “system”).  Claim 6 of the “1840 Patent Reissued 1848” is more like a computer 
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provement in Circuits for Electric Railroad Signals.”92  While the patent 
was for a machine—without mention of a “system”—the Court held that 
“the defendants’ system of signaling is shown not to be an infringement of 
that described in the patent of the appellants.”93  Thus, the Court implied 
that a “system” was a machine.94
The Supreme Court also ruled on “system” claims in Mercoid I, which 
involved the infringement of a patent directed to a “Domestic Heating Sys-
tem.”95  The patent contained five independent claims, three of which re-
cited a “heating system” in the preamble.96  The Court referred to the pat-
ent as a “combination or system patent . . . compris[ing] three main ele-
ments—a motor driven stoker for feeding fuel to the combustion chamber 
of a furnace, a room thermostat for controlling the feeding of fuel, and a 
combustion stoker switch to prevent extinguishment of the fire.”97  There-
fore, the Court implied that the “system” was a machine.98   
The Federal Circuit has also heard several cases regarding “system” 
claims.99  In State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
  
system since it includes machinery: “Sixth. I also claim as my invention the system of signs, consisting 
of dots and spaces, and of dots, spaces, and horizontal lines, substantially as herein set forth and illus-
trated, in combination with machinery for recording them, as signals for telegraphic purposes.”  Id. at 
86.  However, claim 5 does not contain that machinery and thus the nature of the system is less clear: 
“Fifth. I claim, as my invention, the system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and of dots, spaces, 
and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences, substantially as herein set forth and 
illustrated, for telegraphic purposes.”  Id.  Similarly, the system in claim 1 of the 1837 patent is also 
less clear: “First. A system of signs, by which numbers, and consequently words and sentences, are 
signified.”  Id. at 75. 
 92. Elec. R.R. Signal Co., 114 U.S. at 87. 
 93. Id. at 91, 103 (emphasis added).  Claim 1 of the patent at issue is illustrative:  
1. The battery B, in combination with the positive and negative conductors C and Z, two or 
more electro-magnets, M, M<1>, M<2>, for actuating or causing to be actuated visual or 
audible signals, and two or more circuit-closers, a, a<1>, a<2>, placed at intervals along the 
line of a railroad, substantially as and for the purposes specified.  
U.S. Patent No. 140,356 (issued July 1, 1873).  This claim is for a machine made up of the combination 
of a battery, conductors, electromagnets, and circuit-closers.  Id.  The claim does not include any proc-
esses or steps.  See id. 
 94. Elec. R.R. Signal Co., 114 U.S. at 103. 
 95. 320 U.S. 661, 661-62 (1944). 
 96. U.S. Patent No. 1,758,146 (issued May 13, 1930).  Claim 1 recited:  
1. A heating system comprising a combustion pot, means for feeding fuel, thereto, a VO 
combustion space above the combustion pot, means controlled by, the temperature of the 
rooms to be heated for automatically regulating the fuel feeding means, and a separate ther-
mostatic control actuated by predetermined minimum temperatures in said combustion 
space for preventing extinguishment of the fire when operating under low heat requirement 
conditions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 664. 
 98. See id. 
 99. IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005); State St. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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Group,100 the court reversed the district court’s ruling that State Street’s 
patent did not satisfy the statutory subject matter requirement of § 101.101  
State Street’s patent was directed to a “Data Processing System for Hub 
and Spoke Financial Services Configuration.”102  The court stated that the 
claimed “data processing system” (as stated in the claim’s preamble) is a 
“machine . . . made up of, at the very least . . . [the] elements . . . recited in 
the claim.”103  In a more recent case, the Federal Circuit upheld the district 
court’s rejection of a claim reciting both a “system” and a method due to 
indefiniteness.104  The court framed the issue as “[w]hether a single claim 
covering both an apparatus and a method of use of that apparatus is inva-
lid.”105  The relevant claim (claim 25) contained the following language: 
“[t]he system of claim 2 wherein the predicted transaction information 
comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associated 
with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to either 
change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed trans-
action type and transaction parameters.”106  The court criticized the claim 
language by stating that:  
[I]t is unclear whether infringement of claim 25 occurs when one 
creates a system that allows the user to change the predicted trans-
action information or accept the displayed transaction, or whether 
  
 100. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 101. Id. at 1370; see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
 102. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1370. 
 103. Id. at 1372; U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991).  However, the court then stated that 
“for the purposes of a [35 U.S.C.] § 101 analysis, it is of little relevance whether [the claim] is directed 
to a ‘machine’ or a ‘process,’ as long as it falls within at least one of the four enumerated categories of 
patentable subject matter, ‘machine’ and ‘process’ being such categories.”  State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 
1368.  The court stated this because even if the claim fell within § 101, it could still be held unpat-
entable under the previously-held “business method” exception.  Id.
 104. IPXL Holdings, 430 F.3d at 1384; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (2006) (stating that “[t]he specifica-
tion shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention”).
 105. IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see U.S. Patent 
No. 6,149,055 (filed June 26, 1996).  Claim 1 was the only independent claim, which recited the fol-
lowing:  
1. An electronic financial transaction system for executing financial transactions, the trans-
actions being characterized by a transaction type and a plurality of transaction parameters, 
the system comprising: a central controller; a communications network; a terminal device 
selectively connectable to the central controller through the communications network, the 
terminal device comprising: a processor; a display connected to the processor; an input 
mechanism for providing input to the processor; the system further comprising means for 
storing user defined transaction information, the transaction information comprising at least 
one of user defined transactions and user defined transaction parameters; the processor caus-
ing the display to display on a single screen stored transaction information; the input 
mechanism enabling a user to use the displayed transaction information to execute a finan-
cial transaction or to enter selections to specify one or more transaction parameters. 
’055 Patent.
 106. Id. 
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infringement occurs when the user actually uses the input means to 
change transaction information or uses the input means to accept a 
displayed transaction.  Because claim 25 recites both a system and 
the method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of 
ordinary skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under [35 
U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2].107
In other words, the Federal Circuit rejected claim 25 as indefinite because 
it was unclear whether the applicant claimed a machine (the “system”) or a 
method (using the input means).108  The court was concerned because the 
patent laws only permit a claim to include a single statutory classification 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.109  Therefore, the “system” in this case was clearly 
a machine.110
In summary, several early patents included references to “systems.”  It 
appears that “systems” could be either machines or processes depending on 
the context.  While early Supreme Court cases interpreted “systems” in-
consistently, the Court generally has treated “systems” as machines.  In 
addition, the Federal Circuit has consistently interpreted “systems” as ma-
chines.  Therefore, there is a strong historical basis for the courts to treat 
“systems” as machines. 
VI. EFFECT OF “SYSTEM” ON PREAMBLE ANALYSIS 
While there is a historical basis for treating “systems” as machines, the 
courts have not discussed their analysis of preambles that include “sys-
tems.”  The seminal case in preamble analysis is Kropa v. Robie,111 which 
held that the preamble is a limitation to a claim only when the former is 
“necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the claims.”112  The court 
further elaborated in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor 
Materials America, Inc.113 that “[w]hether a preamble stating the purpose 
and context of the invention constitutes a limitation of the claimed [inven-
tion] is determined on the facts of each case in light of the overall form of 
the claim, and the invention as described in the specification and illumi-
nated in the prosecution history.”114
  
 107. IPXL Holdings, 430 F.3d at 1384. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); IPXL Holdings, 430 F.3d at 1384. 
 110. See id. 
 111. 187 F.2d 150, 152 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (binding precedent to the Federal Circuit according to South 
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. 98 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 114. Id. at 1572-73. 
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Therefore, the preamble generally is not a claim limitation.  It follows 
that the statutory category set forth in the preamble should not be a claim 
limitation either, unless the statutory category “give[s] life, meaning and 
vitality to the claim.”115  Thus, the word “system” in the preamble should 
not be a claim limitation since “system” is not even one of the five statu-
tory categories.116  Moreover, “system” has historically been used in the 
context of both machines and processes.117  
As an alternative, the courts could presume that a “system” is a ma-
chine.  The patent applicant could then rebut this presumption by making 
specific statements or definitions in the specification or prosecution his-
tory.118  Under this guideline, the “systems” at issue in NTP II would still 
have been interpreted in the same way (i.e., as machines).  Each of NTP’s 
“system” claims listed structural elements and how they operated with each 
other.119  For example, one “system” claim included one element, which 
affirmatively claimed a wireless receiver and then inferentially claimed a 
mobile processor and a wireless device.120  Here, the wireless receiver is 
certainly a device and not a process.  Therefore, the claim would still have 
been interpreted as a machine and not a process.121
In summary, including the term “system” in a claim’s preamble should 
not, in general, affect the claim’s scope.  Because “system” is a historically 
  
 115. Kropa, 187 F.2d at 152; see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (setting forth the five statutory categories).  
However, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) would most likely reject the claim 
according to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (indefiniteness) if the claim were ambiguous. 
 116. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 117. Compare U.S. Patent No. 256 (issued July 11, 1837) (using “system” in the process context) 
with U.S. Patent No. 1,758,146 (filed Nov. 11, 1926) (using “system” in the machine context). 
 118. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that an 
applicant’s claim language is to be interpreted in light of the patent specification and prosecution his-
tory). 
 119. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 (filed Dec. 6, 1999).  For instance, one of the claims on appeal 
in NTP II recited: 
In a communication system comprising a wireless system which communication system 
transmits electronic mail inputted to the communication system from an originating device 
which executes electronic mail programming to originate the electronic mail, mobile proc-
essors which execute electronic mail programming to function as a destination of electronic 
mail, and a destination processor to which the electronic mail is transmitted from the origi-
nating device and after reception of the electronic mail by the destination processor, infor-
mation contained in the electronic mail and an identification of a wireless device in the 
wireless system are transmitted by the wireless system to the wireless device and from the 
wireless device to one of the mobile processors, the wireless device and one mobile proces-
sor comprising: a wireless receiver connected to the one mobile processor with the one mo-
bile processor receiving the information contained in the electronic mail after the identifica-
tion of the wireless device is detected by the wireless receiver in a broadcast by the wireless 
system. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (interpreting NTP’s claims as “system or 
device” claims). 
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ambiguous term, the applicant should define in the specification whether 
“system” is a machine or a method.  Without a definition in the specifica-
tion, the court could presume that a “system” is a machine.  Even if the 
courts had interpreted “system” under the proposed guidelines, however, 
each of NTP’s “system” claims would still have been interpreted as ma-
chine claims.  Therefore, a response to the problems raised by NTP II 
should come from the manner that the courts analyze direct infringement 
and not from how they interpret the term “system.” 
VII. DIRECT INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS 
Direct infringement occurs when someone “without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of 
the patent therefor.”122  The court conducts a two-part inquiry to determine 
if this has occurred.123  First, the court interprets the patentee’s claims as a 
matter of law.124  Second, the court determines as a matter of fact whether 
the patentee’s claims cover the accused infringer’s product or process.125  
In order for the court to determine whether infringement has occurred, “all 
of the claim’s elements must be found, either literally or by a substantial 
equivalent, in the accused product or process.”126  According to direct in-
fringement analysis, the standard for method and device claim infringe-
ment is the same.127  
Direct infringement analysis was first expanded in Decca Ltd. v. 
United States.128  To determine whether a system was “used . . . within the 
United States” under § 271(a), the Court of Claims focused on the place 
where control of the system was exercised and where “beneficial use of the 
system” was obtained.129  The court would not have found direct infringe-
ment under the prior “use” definition because one of the government’s 
  
 122. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 123. SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 158-59. 
 124. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, 
at 159.  
 125. SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 159. 
 126. Id. (citing Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 127. See id. 
 128. 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam). 
 129. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976); see 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  
See supra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of Decca. 
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radio beacons was located in Norway.130  Therefore, not “all of the claim’s 
elements [were] found . . . in the accused product.”131   
In analyzing NTP’s system claims, the court in NTP I adopted the 
Decca “control and beneficial use” test.132  The NTP II court did not adopt 
the Decca “control and beneficial use” test, however, when analyzing 
NTP’s method claims.133  The court distinguished “system” and method 
claims by stating that:  
Because a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of 
which it is comprised, the use of a process necessarily involves do-
ing or performing each of the steps recited.  This is unlike use of a 
system as a whole, in which the components are used collectively, 
not individually.  We therefore hold that a process cannot be used 
“within” the United States as required by section 271(a) unless 
each of the steps is performed within this country.134
So why did the court draw a line between “system” and method 
claims?  It appears that NTP II would have been a good opportunity to ap-
ply the “control and beneficial use” test to method claims.  RIM owned the 
relay server in Canada and thus had “control” over it and any “steps” it 
performed.135  Furthermore, BlackBerry users received the “benefit” of 
BlackBerry’s email-forwarding process that utilized RIM’s Canadian relay 
“without any command from the BlackBerry user.”136  Therefore, RIM 
most likely infringed NTP’s method claims under the Decca “control and 
beneficial use” test.   
Alternatively, the court could determine which “system” facilitated the 
infringing process and then apply the “control and beneficial use” test to 
that system.  This would effectively allow the court to extend the Decca 
test to process infringement while maintaining its original application in 
  
 130. Decca, 544 F.2d at 1074; see Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 
(1972) (holding that every claimed element must be present in the accused device prior to export in 
order for U.S. patent law to apply). 
 131. SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 159. 
 132. NTP I, 392 F.3d 1336, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 133. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 134. Id. at 1318.  The court did not cite any authority for this proposition.  However, the court stated 
in the prior paragraph that “[a] method or process consists of one or more operative steps, and, accord-
ingly, ‘[i]t is well established that a patent for a method or process is not infringed unless all steps or 
stages of the claimed process are utilized.’”  Id. (quoting Roberts Dairy Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 
1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).  Additionally, the court distinguished Deepsouth by stating that “[a]lthough 
the Supreme Court focused on the whole operable assembly of a system claim for infringement in 
Deepsouth, there is no corresponding whole operable assembly of a process claim.”  Id. at 1317-18.  
Presumably, the court “added” the quote from Roberts Dairy with the Deepsouth distinction to find 
support for its holding.  
 135. Id. at 1290. 
 136. Id. 
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the system context.  A patent owner, however, would be tasked during 
discovery with determining which system facilitated the allegedly infring-
ing process.  This could be expensive and time-consuming, particularly in 
information technologies, because a system could include servers through-
out the world.  It would be the patent owner’s responsibility to determine 
upon which server the allegedly infringing process operated.  Additionally, 
certain processes would not be amenable to this analysis.  For instance, 
“secondary use” patents only require a new use for an old material or 
product; they do not necessarily involve an underlying “system.”137
The scenario of performing a method step abroad could occur in many 
communications or information technologies which incorporate a computer 
to process data.  For instance, the facts from the following cases could eas-
ily be altered so that the infringer could avoid liability under the NTP II 
holding.  In the landmark business method case, State Street Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,138 Signature Financial Group 
owned a patent for a “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Finan-
cial Services Configuration.”139  The technology pooled investment funds 
into a single portfolio to take advantage of economies of scale.140  A server 
analyzed each individual fund to produce a daily account for each portfo-
lio, which investment bankers could access through a personal com-
puter.141  Hypothetically, the server running this financial services program 
could be located in the United States or abroad.  According to the NTP II 
holding, while the system would be running the same program, method 
infringement could only occur if the server was located within the United 
States.142   
Another illustration of NTP II’s holding would be to apply it to the 
landmark software case, Diamond v. Diehr.143  In Diehr, the Supreme 
Court held that the use of computer software to continuously recalculate 
rubber cure time based on a temperature reading was patentable subject 
  
 137. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006) (“The term ‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes 
a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”).  An exam-
ple of a secondary use patent is for the use of aspirin to reduce the risk of heart disease.  See U.S. Patent 
No. 6,673,831 (filed Apr. 27 1998). 
 138. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The Federal Circuit held that a computer system configured to 
calculate and monitor financial information was statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  
Id. at 1370-71.  This holding invalidated the “judicially-created . . . business method exception to 
statutory subject matter.”  Id. at 1375 (quotations omitted). 
 139. Id. at 1370. 
 140. Id. at 1371. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (providing a difference between “system” 
and method claim infringement). 
 143. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.144  Surely the Court did not anticipate that 
infringement could be avoided simply by moving a computer across the 
border to Canada or Mexico.  Furthermore, as the Diehr ruling was handed 
down in 1981, the Court could not have anticipated the rapid increase in 
computing and communications bandwidth that has made it possible to 
physically remove a computer from a manufacturing site. 
In contrast, a situation could arise where an invention includes a com-
ponent located abroad but the “system” or method fails the “control and 
beneficial use” test.  For instance, if the Decca facts were changed so that 
the Norwegian radio beacon was owned and maintained by the Norwegians 
instead of the Americans, the United States would not “control” the navi-
gation system but would still obtain its “beneficial use.”  Another example 
would be a patent for a telecommunications system including a satellite.  If 
a third party owned the satellite, then the telecommunications system’s 
owner would not have “control” of the satellite and could avoid infringing 
the patent. 
The NTP II court distinguished infringement standards based on the 
notion that processes are used “individually” while “systems” are used 
“collectively.”145  Therefore, even if a court found that an alleged infringer 
satisfied the “control and beneficial use” test, the plaintiff would still lose 
if one of the alleged infringer’s process steps occurred outside the United 
States.  According to the Federal Circuit, “there is no corresponding whole 
operable assembly of a process claim.”146  While this might make sense 
with some “old economy” technologies such as oil refining or mining, it 
makes little sense with “new economy” technologies such as the Internet 
where process “steps” can occur within fractions of a second of one an-
other.   
In fact, the NTP II decision could have severe ramifications to many 
information-based patents.  For instance, Amazon.com relies almost exclu-
sively on method claims to protect the “one-click” checkout feature on its 
website.147  It would be fairly easy for a competitor to establish a server 
  
 144. Id. at 178-79, 192. 
 145. 418 F.3d at 1318. 
 146. Id. at 1317-18. 
 147. See U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997).  Claim 1 is illustrative: 
1. A method of placing an order for an item comprising: under control of a client system, 
displaying information identifying the item; and in response to only a single action being 
performed, sending a request to order the item along with an identifier of a purchaser of the 
item to a server system; under control of a single-action ordering component of the server 
system, receiving the request; retrieving additional information previously stored for the 
purchaser identified by the identifier in the received request; and generating an order to pur-
chase the requested item for the purchaser identified by the identifier in the received request 
using the retrieved additional information; and fulfilling the generated order to complete 
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outside the United States to bypass any method claim infringement.  Simi-
larly, Metabolite relies exclusively on method claims to protect its method 
of detecting a vitamin B deficiency in warm-blooded mammals.148  Again, 
it would be trivial for a competitor to perform the step of “correlating an 
elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of 
cobalamin or folate” in another country to avoid infringement.149  In “old 
economy” technologies, this scenario would be covered by § 271(g), which 
was adopted by Congress out of a “concern[] with tangible products and 
not mere information.”150  This section of the patent code protects an 
owner of a process patent from a third party that imports, uses, sells, or 
offers to sell a product made by a patented process.151  Indeed, the NTP II 
court expressly rejected applying § 271(g) to the “email packets” which 
flowed from Canada to the United States.152  In summary, companies prac-
ticing “new economy” technology are left without a remedy to prevent 
competitors from partially or fully practicing their method claims abroad. 
The problems raised by NTP II may be solved in at least two different 
ways.  Preferably, Congress could amend § 271(g) to include “informa-
tion” technologies.153  Alternatively, the Federal Circuit could modify its 
interpretation of § 271(a) to provide a unified definition of “use” for both 
“system” and method patents.154  One way to do this would be to apply the 
Decca “control and beneficial use” test evenhandedly to system and 
method patents.  For instance, the court could adopt the “whole operable 
process” as an equivalent to the “whole operable assembly” provided by 
  
purchase of the item whereby the item is ordered without using a shopping cart ordering 
model. 
Id. 
 148. See Metabolite Labs, Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 126 S. Ct. 2921 
(2006).  Claim 13 is representative: “A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in 
warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total 
homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a defi-
ciency of cobalamin or folate.”  Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986)). 
 149. Id. at 1359. 
 150. 35 U.S.C § 271(g) (2006); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 151. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). 
 152. 418 F.3d 1282, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Bayer AG, 340 F.3d at 1367). 
 153. A rewording of § 271(g) to include “information” technologies would be the following: 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses 
within the United States a product or information which is made or modified by a process 
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, 
sale, or use of the product or information occurs during the term of such process patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (italicized language was added to cover “information” technologies). 
 154. One way to do this would be to apply the Decca “control and beneficial use” test evenhandedly 
to system and method patents.  This, however, would require the Federal Circuit to overrule NTP II.  
See NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1317-18. 
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Deepsouth.155  This, however, would require the Federal Circuit to overrule 
NTP II.156   
The paradox established by NTP II is that a competitor’s “system” can 
infringe a “system” claim, but the competitor’s method that uses that in-
fringing “system” might not infringe a method claim, depending on the 
location of the “system’s” components.  This lack of unity between “sys-
tem” and method infringement analysis will weaken the U.S. patent system 
unless Congress or the courts take the necessary action to correct it. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in NTP II created an artificial and un-
necessary distinction between method and “system” infringement law.  
This distinction could limit patent protection of method claims that could 
easily be performed in a foreign country.  Furthermore, the court did not 
consider the historical roots of “system” claims with respect to the statu-
tory categories defined in § 101.  Based on the common law historical us-
age, a “system” could be presumed to be a machine claim.  The court 
should perform a fact-specific analysis, however, for each patent based on 
the applicant’s statements in the specification and prosecution history.   
The court placed too much emphasis on the “individual” nature of 
process steps in contrast to the “joint” nature of machine elements.  As 
such, the court held that a “system” with an extraterritorial component 
could infringe a U.S. patent if the “system” satisfied the “control and bene-
ficial use” test even though a process that runs on that same “system” 
could not.  If the court is willing to broaden its interpretation of “use” in § 
271(a) to include “control and beneficial use,” the court should do so 
evenhandedly.  Thus, the court should adopt a “whole operable process” 
definition for method claims as the analog to the “whole operable assem-
bly” definition for machine claims.  This is particularly relevant in the 
“new economy” era where information technology, having steps easily 
exportable overseas, is critical to our economy. 
  
 155. See 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). 
 156. See 418 F.3d at 1317-18. 
